Résumé
La Nueva Filosofía Mecanicista o NFM (Skipper y Milstein, 2005) ha estado adquiriendo en los últimos años una importante significación dentro de la filosofía de la ciencia moderna. Esta corriente de pensamiento sostiene como tesis general que una gran variedad de fenómenos en los sistemas concretos son producto de la operación de mecanismos. El presente trabajo analizará algunos de los aspectos más salientes de la NFM: (1) el uso de regularidades en reemplazo de leyes; (2) la explicación a través de mecanismos como alternativa a las explicaciones nomotéticas – en función de que estas muestran el qué de un resultado, sin clarificar el cómo-; y (3) el compromiso con la noción de causalidad, pensada tanto en términos de producción como de dependencia contrafáctica. También se ofrecerá un análisis acerca de la ontología (monismo vs dualismo) de los mecanismos.
Références
Bechtel, W. (2005). “The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms
underlying behavior”. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, Vol. 84, No.
, pp. 313–325.
Bechtel W. y Abrahamsen, A. (2005). “Explanation: a mechanist alternative”. Studies in
History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.
-441.
Bechtel, W. y Richardson, R. (1993). Discovering complexity: decomposition and localization
as strategies in scientific research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bennett, A. (2003). “Beyond Hempel and back to Hume: causal mechanisms and causal
explanation”. Trabajo presentado en American Political Science Association Meetings,
Filadelfia.
Bunge, M. (1967). Scientific research. 2 vols. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Rev. ed., philosophy
of science, 2 vols., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998.
Bunge, M. (1968). The maturation of science. In Problems in the philosophy of science,
edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 120-37. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bunge, M. (1983). Treatise on basic philosophy. Vol. 6, Understanding the world. Dordrecht,
the Netherlands: Kluwer/Reidel.
Bunge, M. (1997). “Mechanism and explanation”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 27,
No. 4, pp. 410–465.
Bunge, M. (2000). La relación entre la sociología y la filosofía. EDAF.
Bunge, M. (2004). “How Does It Work? The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms”.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 182-210.
Bunge, M. (2005). Buscar la filosofía en las ciencias sociales. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI
editores.
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Cartwright, N. (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them –Approaches in Philosophy and
Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. and Efstathiou, S. (2011). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Is There No
Bridge from Here to There? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25 (3),
pp. 223-241.
Craver, C. (2001). Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy. Philosophy of Science, 68
(1), pp. 53-74.
Craver, C. (2006). When Mechanistic Models Explain. Synthese, 153 (3), pp. 355-376.
Craver C. (2007). Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craver, C. y Bechtel, W. (2006), “Mechanism”, en The Philosophy of Science: An
Encyclopedia, Ed. Sahotra Sarkar y Jessica Pfeifer, Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group, LLC.
Darden, L. (2002). Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 69 (S3),
pp. S354-S365.
Darden, L. (2006). Reasoning in Biological Discoveries. Essays on Mechanisms, Interfield
Relations, and Anomaly Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1998). A plea for mechanisms. In P. Hedström and R. Swedberg, eds.1998. Social
Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pp. 45-73.
Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Glennan, S. (1992). Mechanisms, Models, and Causation. Ph.D. Dissertation. Chicago:
University of Chicago.
Glennan, S. (1996). “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation”. Erkenntnis, Vol. 44, pp. 49-
Glennan, S. (2002). “Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation”. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 69,
pp. S342-S353.
Glennan, S. (2005). “Modeling mechanisms”. Studies in history and philosophy of biological
and biomedical sciences, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 443–464.
Glennan, S. (2008). “Mechanisms”. En S. Psillos y M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion
to Philosophy of Science. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 376-384.
Hall, N. (2004). “Two Concepts of Causation”. En J. Collins, L. Paul y N. Hall (eds.),
Counterfactuals and Causation. MIT Press, pp. 225-276.
Hedström, P. (2005). Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hedström, P. y Bearman P. (eds.) (2009a). The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Hedström, P. y Bearman P. (2009b). “What is analytical sociology all about? An introductory
essay”. En P. Hedström y P. Bearman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Analytical
Sociology. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 3–24.
Hedström, P. y Swedberg, R. (1996). “Social mechanisms”. Acta sociologica, Vol. 39, pp.
–308.
Hedström, P. y Swedberg, R. (eds.) (1998a), Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to
Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hedström, P. Y Swedberg, R. (1998b). “Social mechanisms: an introductory essay”. En P.
Hedström y R. Swedberg (eds.), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–31.
Hedström, P. e Ylikoski, P. (2010). “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences”. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 49–67.
Hempel, C. (1966). Filosofía de la ciencia natural. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Hempel, C. (1979). La explicación científica. Estudios sobre la filosofía de la ciencia. Barcelona: Paidós.
Hempel, C. y Oppenheim, P. (1948). “Studies in the logic of explanation”. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, pp. 135-175.
Hitchcock, Ch., y Woodward, J. (2003), “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, Nous, 37: 2, 181 – 199.
Little D., 1991. Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social
Science. Boulder: Westview.
Lucas, R.E., Jr. (1972), “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 4, 103–124.
Machamer, P., Darden, L., and Craver, C., 2000. Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of
Science, 67 (1), pp. 1–25.
Mayes, R. (2001), "Theories of Explanation", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
CSU/Sacramento, http://www.iep.utm.edu/explanat/
Psillos, S. (2004). “A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: Harmonizing Mechanisms with
Counterfactuals”. Perspectives on Science, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 288-319.
Railton, P. (1978). “A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation”.
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, pp. 206-226.
Reiss, J. (2007). “Do We Need Mechanisms in the Social Sciences?”. Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 163-184.
Rescher, N. (1996). Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Salmon, W. (1971). “Statistical explanation”. En W. Salmon (ed.), Statistical explanation and
statistical relevance. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 29–87.
Salmon, W. (1984). “Scientific Explanation: Three Basic Conceptions”. PSA: Proceedings of
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1984, N. 2.
Symposia and Invited Papers, pp. 293-305.
Salmon, W. (1985). “Conflicting Conceptions of Scientific Explanation”. The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 11, pp. 651-654.
Skipper, R. y Milstein, R. (2005). “Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural
selection”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences,
Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 327-347.
Tabery, J. (2004). Synthesizing activities and interactions in the concept of a mechanism.
Philosophy of science, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 1–15.
Tabery, J. (2009). “Difference mechanisms: explaining variation with mechanisms”. Biology
and Philosophy, Vol. 24, pp. 645–664.
Torres, P. (2009). “A Modified Conception of Mechanisms”. Springer, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp.
-251.
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Woodward, J. (1996), “Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention”. Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 64 (Proceedings), pp. S26-S41.
Woodward, J. (2000). “Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences”. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 51, pp. 197-254.
Woodward, J. (2002). “What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account”. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 69, pp. S366-S377.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2006). “Some Varieties of Robustness”. Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 219–40.
Woodward, J. (2007). “Causation with a Human Face”. En H. Price y R. Corry (eds.),
Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–105.
Woodward, J. (2011). “Scientific Explanation”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scientific-explanation
Woodward, J. (2013). “Causation and Manipulability”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/causation-mani
Woodward, J., y Hitchcock, Ch. (2003). “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”. Nous, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 1–24.
Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
(c) Tous droits réservés Asociación de Filosofía Eikasía 2015