Palabras clave
Cómo citar
Resumen
El método de aislamiento teorético es una forma de
experimento mental que se utiliza con el objetivo de separar
la contribución causal de un mecanismo de un conjunto de
factores perturbadores. Dicho método ha resultado ser
exitoso en disciplinas como la física. Sin embargo, este no
parece ser el caso de la economía. Cartwright (2009) asevera
que dichos experimentos no funcionan en la economía
debido al escaso número de principios que esta posee.
Como consecuencia de ello, la autora concluye que los
modelos económicos sólo nos brindarán información
restringida a dominios muy específicos, rara vez
extrapolable al mundo real. Un argumento alternativo es
ofrecido en el presente trabajo. Específicamente, se
argumentará que los aislamientos teoréticos no funcionan en
disciplinas sociales como la economía simplemente porque
estas responden a la lógica del “árbol de posibilidades” más
que a una lógica mecanicista. Adicionalmente, se sostendrá
que los modelos sí pueden proporcionarnos información
extrapolable, en la medida en que las restricciones que
figuran en éste sean tomadas como condiciones a ser
cumplidas en el mundo real.
Citas
Bechtel W. y Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of
the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36 (2), pp. 421-441.
Bunge, M. (1997). Mechanism and explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 27 (4), pp. 410–465.
Bunge, M. (2000). Bunge M. (2004). How does it work? The search for explanatory mechanisms. Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
(2), pp. 182–210.
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Ceteris Paribus Laws and Socio-Economic Machines. Monist, 78 (3), pp. 276-294.
Cartwright, N. (1997) Models: The Blueprints for Laws. Philosophy of Science, 64, s292-s303.
Cartwright, N. (1998). Capacities. En J. Davis, W. Hands, & U. Maki (Eds.), The handbook of economic
methodology. (pp. 45-48). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Cartwright, N. (1999a). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999b), The Vanity of Rigour in Economics: Theoretical Models and
Galilean Experiments. Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. Discussion. También publicado en
Cartwright (2007), Hunting causes and using them: Approaches in philosophy and economics, pp. 217–261.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them –Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2009). If no capacities then no credible worlds. But can models reveal capacities? Erkenntnis, pp.
-58.
M A Y O
0 1 4
Leonardo Ivarola | Aislamiento teorético de mecanismos económicos. Un enfoque crítico
Cartwright, N. y Efstathiou, S. (2011). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Is There No Bridge from Here to There?
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25 (3), pp. 223-241.
Darden, L. (2002). Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 69 (S3), pp. S354-S365.
Darden, L. (2006). Reasoning in Biological Discoveries. Essays on Mechanisms, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly
Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glennan, S. (1992). Mechanisms, Models, and Causation. Ph.D. Dissertation. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Glennan, S. (1996). Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis, 44 (1), pp. 49-71.
Glennan, S. (2002). Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69(S3), pp. S342-S353.
Glennan, S. (2008). Mechanisms. En S. Psillos and M. Curd, eds. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Science. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 376-384.
Hands, D. (2001). Reflection without rules. Economic methodology and contemporary science theory. Cambridge
University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162 (3859), pp. 1243–1248.
Hausman, D. (1992). The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Hedström, P. y Swedberg, R. (eds.) (1998a). Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hedström, P. y Swedberg, R. (1998b). Social mechanisms: an introductory essay. En P. Hedström y R. Swedberg
(eds.), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
–31.
pp. 49–67.
Keynes, J. (1936[2007]). La teoría general de la ocupación, el interés y el dinero. Fondo de cultura económica.
Buenos Aires.
Kuorikoski, J. y Lehtinen, A. (2009). Incredible Worlds, Credible Results. Erkenntnis, 70, pp. 119–31.
Kuorikoski, J., Lehtinen, A. y Marchionni, C. (2010). Economic Modelling as Robustness Analysis. British Journal
Hedström, P. e Ylikoski, P. (2010). Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences. Annual Review of Sociology, 36 (1),
for the Philosophy of Science, 61, pp. 541–567.
Lawson, T. (1997). Economics and Reality. Londres y Nueva York: Routledge.
Lucas, R. (1981). Studies in Business-Cycle Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Mäki, U. (1992). On the Method of Idealization in Economics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences
and the Humanities, 26, pp. 319-354.
Mäki, U. (ed.) (2002). Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism, and Social Construction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Mäki, U. (2005). Models are experiments, experiments are models. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12, pp. 303–315.
Mäki, U. (2009). MISSing the world: Models as isolations, representations and credible worlds. Erkenntnis, 70, pp. 29–43.
Mäki, U. (2011). Models and the locus of their truth. Synthese, 180 (1), pp. 47-63.
Machamer, P., Darden, L., y Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67 (1), pp. 1–25.
Mayntz, R. (2004), Mechanisms in the Analysis of Macro-Social Phenomena. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34 (2), pp. 237-259.
Mill, J. S. (1843/1967). A system of logic. London: Longman.
Musgrave, A. (1981). Unreal Assumptions in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted. Kyklos, 34 (3), pp. 377- 387.
Torres, P. (2009). A Modified Conception of Mechanisms. Springer, 71 (2), pp. 233-251.
Wimsatt, W. (1981). Robustness, Reliability and Overdetermination. En Brewer, M. y B. Collins (eds), Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 124–63.
Woodward, J. (2002). What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account. Philosophy of Science, 69 (S3), S366–S377.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.
Derechos de autor 2014 Asociación de Filosofía Eikasía