Passive synthesis and intersubjectivity in Husserl's genetic phenomenology

Abstract

This master's thesis deals with two fundamental problems from the Cartesian Meditations as a starting point, which motivated various objections to the idealistic, subjectivistic background of Husserl's phenomenology. The first problem relates to the method of the phenomenological epoché, namely the exclusion (bracketing) of the natural attitude and the reduction to the contents of consciousness. The second concerns the presentation of the problem of the experience of others in the V. Meditation: The consideration of another subject as an analogue and thereby as a possibility of one's own consciousness raises an objection to the obvious solipsism that would be contained in Husserl's phenomenology. Both themes equally point to the necessity of hypostatizing a transcendental ego as a guarantee of the succession and simultaneity of the a priori form of time. Before presenting the main theses of this work and the organization of its chapters, I will briefly outline the two problems mentioned.