Phenomena and concretenesses: phenomenological reduction as mereological reduction

Abstract

This paper explores the possibility of a mereological approach (i. e. within the very terms of the 3.^rd Logical Investigation) of phenomenological concreteness. After exhibiting the mereological structure of the natural attitude, shared by the Logical Investigations’ underlying ontology, we dare a sort of mereological translation of the transition to transcendental phenomenology. We finally set up the sense of a mereological reduction as the formal counterpart of the transcendental reduction. We therefore redefine, accordingly, the proper phenomenological sense pertaining to the task of legitimizing constitutions. We, thereupon, deal with the apparent paradox relying on both an absolute mereological dependence between the parts (in concrescence) and the absolute irreducibility of their senses. This paradox is said to be apparent (there isn’t such paradox) for it overlooks the difference between the ontological and the phenomenological point of view.