Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Poietics

Abstract

The following text examines, firstly, the symbolic tautology that pervades Husserl’s phenomenology of language. Despite the acknowledgement of a pre-existing ontological stock of meaning to which the meaning of the expression must adapt itself, in reality the expression fulfills the function of reflecting this noematic meaning in an image (Abbild) as it is, in order to be able to be figured (Einbildung) as a concept.

Such a mirroring reduplication (Wiederspiegelung), out of which the antepredicative would be a faithful reflection of the predicative, amounts to a «phenomenological nominalism» since it implies a loss of the phenomenological density proper to language. Secondly, it claims that it is poietics, that is, artistic creation that arrives at unveiling the phenomenological dimension of language itself, insofar as it makes use of «imagination» (Einbildungskraft) in the sense of an Einbildung in the making, which implies both a distortion inherent to its realization, as well as a figuration that operates without concept, whereby it lets Wesen more primitive or wilder than those proper to the eide logically instituted by language come into phenomenalization.