Abstract
This article deals with the thorny debate idealism-realism that arose within the phenomenological school between Edmund Husserl and his students. After a first contextualization of the problem, it examines Edith Stein's position regarding the aforementioned question and the discussed Husserlian idealism, and shows how the phenomenologist re-dimensioned the role of the self in the cognitive activity: no longer as an absolute and unconditioned subject of knowledge, but as a finite and limited creature that relates to a transcendent world, independent of the activity of consciousness.![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2022 Eikasía S.L.
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