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Abstract
The method of theoretical isolation is a kind of thought
experiment that is used in order to seal off the causal
mechanism from a set of disturbing factors. Theoretical
isolation has been proved to be successful in physics.
However, this does not seem to be the case for economics.
Cartwright (2009) asserts that this does not work because of
the scarcity of economic principles. Consequently, the
author concludes that economic models provide
information only restricted to very specific domains, rarely
extrapolated to the real world. An alternative point of view
is offered in the present paper. Specifically, it is argued that
theoretical isolation does not work in economics simply
because it responds to the logic of "ʺpossibility trees"ʺ rather
than the logic of mechanisms. In addition to this, it is
asseverated that insofar as model restrictions are taken to be
conditions to be met in the real world, models may provide
extrapolated information.
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