Abstract
Can morality be based on nature? Hume pointed out the gap existing between an “is” statement and an “ought” one, noting the impropriety of transition from facts to
valuation, idea later developed under the name of “naturalistic fallacy”. Kantian ethics allows for this gap, establishing an “insurmountable abyss” between the
realm of nature and that of liberty. But when doing so it pays too high a price. Morality is severed from such an important natural sphere as the realm of sentiments. Perhaps nowadays we are in a better position to revisit that abyss, by incorporating the contributions of phenomenology in order to overcome the split between the empirical world and moral laws.
References
D. Hume, Investigación sobre los principios de la moral, Apéndice 1. Aguilar, Buenos Aires.
I.Kant, Crítica de la razón pura, A 547 – B 575.
L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus lógico-philosophicus, 6.41.
G. Vattimo, Nihilismo y emancipación, Paidós, Barcelona, 2004
E. Levinas, Totalidad e infinito, Sígueme, Salamanca, 1977. 5 I. Kant, Crítica de la razón práctica, I parte, libro 1º, cap. I.
I. Kant, Crítica de la razón práctica, I parte, libro 1º, cap. I.
I. Kant, Fundamentación de la Metafísica de las Costumbres, cap. II.
Metafísica de las Costumbres, II parte, I, párrafo 7.
Kant califica de “patológico” al amor que surge de los sentimientos, contraponiéndolo al amor “práctico” que surge de la voluntad. Fundamentación, cap. I.
E. Levinas, ob.cit., cap. 3, II “Rostro y ética”.
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