Heidegger and the Overcoming of Metaphysics (Itinerary of a Progressive Radicalization)

Abstract

Despite his clear will of demarcation, the shadow of metaphysics haunts Heidegger throughout his work, periodically emerging under the guise that he considers the most remote from his philosophical program: that of Hegelian idealism. How to interpret the constant emergence of this shadow in a philosophy that has tried so hard to ward it off? Does he appear as the emissary of his inability to overcome metaphysics? This is how Heidegger himself seems to have understood it, who continues to redefine his relationship with metaphysics over the years, trying new ways of overcoming it. This article covers the most important milestones of this evolution, focusing on the terminological variations that run through it. There seems to be a growing radicalization that threatens to betray the assumptions of their initial program inspired by the Kantian foundation of the eigentliche Metaphysik. Is this radicalization the result of the better understanding of the problem of metaphysics that Heidegger would have acquired over the years, or should it be understood rather as a reaction to the misunderstandings surrounding the reception of his initial show?