Abstract
The concept of «normal science» formulated by Thomas Kuhn requires a critical reassessment of its ambiguity, its implicit normative framework, and its limited analogies. Historical and epistemic objections reveal that it is not the operative model it is often taken to be, but rather functions as a monist machinery. Contrary to the idea that science advances by solving problems, this essay argues that its strength lies in the capacity to generate new enigmas. A new perspective on scientific crises is proposed: not as the result of accumulated anomalies, but as symptoms of a depletion in problem production.
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