Epistemes, paradigms and a priori: Foucault, Kuhn and the study of discourse

Abstract

Michel Foucault and Thomas S. Kuhn examined scientific discourse in the twentieth century from different perspectives: Foucault focused on the human and social sciences, whereas Kuhn concentrated on the natural sciences. Both challenged the classical conception of knowledge by arguing that, within a historical framework, different ways of knowing coexist and none can be regarded as inherently superior to the others. To analyse this historicity, they developed meta-analytical tools: epistemes in Foucault and paradigms in Kuhn, understood as the historical conditions of possibility for knowledge, in line with the Kantian notion of the a priori. However, they treated this a priori differently and established distinct relationships with the concept of worldview. These differences reflect contrasting attitudes: Kuhn largely accepted the operation of scientific paradigms, whereas Foucault adopted a critical stance, exposing power-knowledge relations as mechanisms through which subjectivity is historically and artificially constructed.