The phenomenon of the look: from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

In phenomenology there are generally two approaches to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity: the cartesian or neo-Hegelian approach ¾represented by Sartre; and the ontological-social approach ¾represented by the Heideggerian Mitsein. Merleau-Ponty is known to follow a current strongly influenced by Heidegger, an influence that extends also in intersubjectivity. But despite the Heideggerian preponderance, Merleau-Ponty integrates important aspects of Sartrean intersubjective theory into his philosophy. On this basis, one might ask, how can Merleau-Ponty harmonize two opposing currents in the field of intersubjectivity? It is the concept of the look and of being-with that will coexist in the Merleau-Pontian social philosophy of the Phenomenology of perception. Thus, we will try to show that Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjective understanding overcomes the split between Sartre’s and Heidegger’s intersubjective approaches. Since is takes as its basis the Heideggerian Mitsein, but maintains, at the same time, the conflict status of the Sartrean look.