Keywords
Paul Natorp
fenómeno
contenido
aprehensión Edmund Husserl
Paul Natorp
Phenomenon
Content
Apprehension Edmund Husserl
Paul Natorp
fenómeno
conteúdo
apreensão
How to Cite
Abstract
Does phenomenology allow us to pave the way for a privileged understanding of phenomena? A glance at the philosophical history of the concept of «phenomenon» suffices to confront us with complex results, not always easy to grasp. We need only mention two: the definitions of what a «phenomenon» is vary considerably both within and outside the phenomenological tradition; the phenomenological understanding of phenomena has been the object, especially since Husserl, of various objections from direct opponents, and continues to be so in the current debate that puts phenomenology to the test of criticism from other philosophical approaches ¾from analytically inspired philosophy of mind to the so-called cognitive sciences. We will therefore focus on the dialogue between Husserl and Natorp in order to demonstrate the originality of the Husserlian approach, limiting ourselves to Natorp’s critique of the theses expressed in the fifth of the Logische Untersuchungen. Our aim is therefore twofold: to formulate the necessary arguments to counter Natorp’s objections by focusing on the Logische Untersuchungen; to defend, in perspective, the specificity of the phenomenological understanding of phenomena in the face of certain alternatives that we find in the current debate.
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