Freedom in the philosophy of mind of John Rogers Searle

Abstract

This article presents and critically analyzes John Rogers Searle’s proposal regarding free will. In order to do this, we will first demonstrate that, for him, free will should be understood from the perspective of the first person; that is to say, from the subjective experience. From that point, he establishes that free will is expressed in the phenomenon of the gap, that is to say, in the leap we experience between the causes and effects in the process of realizing an action. This leap manifests itself in the acts performed for independent reasons of desire, as is seen in strong altruism. Secondly, with respect to the critical value of Searle’s proposal, we consider the importance of the first person perspective to free will. We then demonstrate that an analogical notion of cause permits a better understanding of free acts, and also avoids dualism and materialistic reductionism. This perspective, from the AristotelianThomistic tradition which we call the third person, should be complemented with internal reflection, as noted by Michele Federico Sciacca. Finally, we conclude with a brief observation on the proposition of interdisciplinary dialogues as a form to understand anthropological issues.