Abstract
The main lines of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception are exposed, from his initial approaches based on the latest works of Edmund Husserl to the final conclusions, where it is shown that phenomenology ends up becoming fundamentally a philosophy of corporeality and socially shared daily life. Perception is understood by Merleau-Ponty as an intelligent act that is always accompanied by a horizon that refers to our body and vital experience, so that the concepts of space and time are enriched by the idea of a pre-existing world of life; a world that is visible thanks to intersubjective and pre-predicative links of social coexistence.
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