Abstract
This article is a critique of some important epistemological and political components of the pragmatic doctrine. The epistemological part deals, although not exclusively, with the notion of truth, and the political part with the notion of ideology. The main affirmations are the following: 1) in all order of things, pragmatism is the tendency to act without understanding, an attitude that tends to give an erroneously narrow image of the human being; 2) the truth is not the stabilized opinion; 3) at least in the hard sciences, not all truth is manufactured; 4) the pragmatism/ideology dichotomy is false because pragmatism is an ideology; 5) just as the pragmatist is incapable of explaining, as a pragmatist, why conjectures can converge, neither can he determine by virtue of what —what ideology— is going to arbitrate when the actions that value things are incompatible with each other or indicate different priorities.
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