Abstract
The intent of this brief note is to show that in a philosophy of a materialist nature, the Transcendental Ego is a philosopheme, at least, idle.
It is evident that we are talking about materialist philosophy when reality is decentered and, starting from the aspectable world, we are led, not to a noumenal beyond that continues to be the shadow of Being, but to matter as a radical plurality. Decentering that in the end results double: of the Being but also of the Subject.
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