The causal relationship between mind and body
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Keywords

problema mente-cuerpo
causalidad
ciencias cognitivas
epistemología
filosofía de la mente
John Searle Mind-body problem
Causality
Cognitive sciences
Epistemology
Philosophy of mind
John Searle

How to Cite

Guarino, J. I. (2010). The causal relationship between mind and body: Searle and «biological naturalism». Eikasía Revista De Filosofía, (32), 33–41. https://doi.org/10.57027/eikasia.32.460

Abstract

The problem of the causal relationship between the body and the mind seems to deserve, due to its importance and the time dedicated to it, a separate chapter in the theory of knowledge, in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive sciences. The body-mind dualism greatly hinders the theoretical explanation of a causal link between one and the other, a central problem in Descartes' philosophy, more easily traceable to earlier authors such as Saint Augustine or Plato. In the present work we will analyze the development carried out by John Searle in order to overcome this problem through a theoretical reformulation of the concepts involved in its description and conceptualization. Its treatment is based on the replacement of the traditional concept of causality with a more complex one, through the theoretical introduction of different levels of observation and the concept of realization, integral to this new concept of causality.

https://doi.org/10.57027/eikasia.32.460
pdf (Español (España))

References

Boden, M. A. (1988), «Escaping from the Chinese room», en Boden, M. (1990), The philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. New York, Oxford University Press, 89-104.

Searle, J. R. (1999), «The future of philosophy», en Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society B, Millenium Issue. London, Royal Society Press.

Searle, J. R. [1983], Intencionalidad. Un ensayo en la filosofía de la mente. Madrid, Tecnos, 1992.

Searle, J. R. (1980), «Minds, Brains, and Programs», en Boden, M. (1990), The philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. New York, Oxford University Press, 67-88.

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