La libertad en la filosofía de la mente de John Rogers Searle

Abstract

This article presents and critically analyzes John Rogers Searle’s proposal regarding free will. In order to do this, we will first demonstrate that, for him, free will should be understood from the perspective of the first person; that is to say, from the subjective experience. From that point, he establishes that free will is expressed in the phenomenon of the gap, that is to say, in the leap we experience between the causes and effects in the process of realizing an action. This leap manifests itself in the acts performed for independent reasons of desire, as is seen in strong altruism. And for Searle, only an I, whose characteristics emerge from the brain, can recognize these reasons to act according to them. Secondly, with respect to the critical value of Searle’s proposal, we consider the importance of the first person perspective to free will. We then demonstrate that an analogical notion of cause permits a better understanding of free acts, and also avoids dualism and materialistic reductionism. This perspective, from the Aristotelian-‐Thomistic tradition which we call the third person, should be complemented with internal reflection, as noted by Michele Federico Sciacca, that is to say, from the first person perspective. Both philosophical lines unite in the metaphysical consideration of man. Finally, we conclude with a brief observation on the proposition of interdisciplinary dialogues as a form to understand anthropological issues.