El primado del espacio en la fenomenología del cuerpo de Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

In  his  Phénoménologie  de  la  Perception   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  intends to  solve  the  problem  of  the  relations  between  conscience  and organism  by  conceibing  them  in  terms  of  time,  thus  locating the  topic  of  time  at  a  cardinal  place  of  his  entire  philosophy. Nevertheless,   a   trend   already   present   in   that   work   and which  will  be  accentuated  in  the  last  courses  and  writings  of the   philosopher   -­‐‑those   alluding   to   a   "ʺ   topology   of   being"ʺ-­‐‑ points  to  subordinate  the  definition  of  time  to  that  of  space, in   clear   opposition   to   classic   Bergsonian   analyses.   In   turn, the   notion   of   space   as   a   "ʺsimultaneity   of   uncomposable perspectives"ʺ   contrasts   with   the   Husserlian   thesis   of   the unity   of   perceived   world.   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   finds   some expressions   of   this   spatiality   in   oneiric   and   infantile experience,  allowing  us  to  elucidate  certain  posible  relations between   this   original   phenomenology   of   space   and Freudian  psychoanalysis.