The sense of the world before all philosophizing: an exploration of the pre-reflective sense and a critique of Husserl's Cartesianism

Abstract

Husserl's idea of the meaning of the world before all philosophizing implies taking a step back from the reflection of the philosophical Ego, going to the pre- reflective (non-eidetic) sphere; nevertheless, although Husserl does take a step back by deeply reviewing the processes of passive syntheses in which the Ego is not positioned, at the level of the register of fantasy and perception —with which he could have made a decentralization of the transcendental Ego—, returns to the philosophical Ego seeking to express, in the mode of eidetic evidence of the consciousness, the pre-reflective sense gained in the processes of intentional correlation operant of passive syntheses. The thesis of this essay is that, of the two epistemological pathways present in Husserl's philosophy, the epistemic path of the transcendental Ego (the “Cartesian path”, as he calls it), is imposed over the Husserl path of the experience (the "path of the world-of-life", as he will define it in Crisis), in relation to his idea of the sense of the world before all philosophizing, despite its pre-reflective implications.