Abstract
This work discusses different formulations of the notion of “determinist world”. It is contended that several of those formulations made the notion trivial. In fact, various forms of presenting the notion made any world whatever determinist. A better construal of a determinist world should appeal to ontologically robust conceptions of natural laws and a non-combinatorial theory of metaphysical modality. Finally, the work suggests some consequences of the distinctions introduced for the problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism.
References
A. N. Prior, “Earlier and Later” en Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968
F. P. Ramsey, “Proposiciones generales y causalidad” en Los fundamentos de la matemática y otros ensayos sobre lógica, Santiago: Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, 1968
D. M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature?; A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1997
D. M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? 158-171; M. Tooley, Causation. A Realist Approach, 76-78.
D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986
D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, especialmente 1-43.
C. Ginet, “Libertarianism” en M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2003
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.