Cuerpo, tiempo, alter ego. Archifacticidades y límite transcendental

Abstract

How can and how should the project of transcendental phenomenological idealism deal with the problem of "ʺarchifacticities"ʺ? We handle that issue in this paper by analyzing, as announced in its first part, some concrete constitutions: that of the alter ego or those related to inner time-­‐‑consciousness. In both cases apresentations appear to play an important role: absences happen to be essential to the presence. Nevertheless, the key to all of this constitution problems seems to be the double nature of the body. First, the body is a Körper, a physical thing among other things in the world. However, the body is also a Leib: this very same body is also lived from the inside, and appears with an entirely sui generis phenomenality. The transcendental knot of this constitutive problems relies on the possibility, for a Leib, to become a Körper, or, to put it in other words, on the way a lived body (Leib) achieves its incorporation (Verkörperung).